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Abstract
This paper addresses three questions that are relevant to integrating different regional
transmission areas. Market integration normally increases the number of competitors and
should therefore reduce prices but the first section shows that prices could rise when the number
of generators initially increases. Regulatory effort will also be affected by market integration.
If the number of generators in either market is low, then our analysis suggests that the outcome
depends on whether the regulators act independently or coordinate. Finally, if markets are
gradually combined into larger units, the choice of transmission allocation (auctions or market
coupling) will affect the prospects of making further gains and hence could lead to incomplete
reform.
1 Problems in the evolution towards competitive markets
In 1990 the Central Electricity Generating Board (covering generation and transmission in Eng-
land and Wales) was restructured to separate out transmission (as the National Grid Company)
and three generation companies: National Power, PowerGen, and Nuclear Electric. All except
Nuclear Electric were privatized, although the modern stations of Nuclear Electric were subse-
quently sold as British Energy in 1996. Nuclear Electric, as its name suggests, contained all
the nuclear power stations: the aging Magnox stations, the more modern Advanced Gas Cooled
Reactors, whose earlier troubled history of delays appeared to have ended around 1990, and one
PWR under construction. All these nuclear plant were inflexible and ran on base-load, while the
fleet of mainly coal-fired power stations were divided in the ratio of 5:3 between the other two
fossil-based generating companies. As these set the price 99% of the time, it was feared that the
∗We would like to thank Damien Caby, Christophe Gence-Creux and Richard Green for comments and
Heren Energy for providing electricity prices. Research support from Cambridge-MIT Institute under the
project 045/P ‘Promoting Innovation and Productivity in Electricity Markets’ is gratefully acknowledged.
Karsten.Neuhoff@econ.cam.ac.uk, David.Newbery@econ.cam.ac.uk, Faculty of Economics, University of Cam-
bridge, Sidgwick Avenue, Cambridge CB3 9DE, UK
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resulting duopoly would have the market power to result in excessive prices (Green and Newbery,
1992).
In the event, wholesale prices did not increase much in real terms in the first three years,
although the price-cost margin gradually widened as coal costs fell and performance improved.
Initially essentially all output was covered by vesting contracts (i.e. contracts written to take
effect from the date at which the companies were formed), removing the incentive to bid up spot
prices in the Electricity Pool (Newbery, 1995, 1998; Green, 1999). Over time these contracts
lapsed and were replaced by new, freely negotiated contracts that might have been expected to
reflect the significant market power of the duopoly. Indeed, as old contracts expired and new ones
were signed, two major events signalled the dramatic change in market structure and conduct
that privatization had set in train. The first, in 1993, was the ending of the coal contracts with
British Coal, and a resulting crisis in the coal industry as it became clear that gas-fired combined
cycle gas turbines offered an attractive vehicle for entry into a prospectively very profitable
industry. The second, in 1994, was the finding by the Office of Electricity Regulation, Offer, that
the price-cost margin had risen above the level consistent with a competitive wholesale market.
Offer imposed a price cap for two years to allow time for the industry to propose a remedy, and
in 1996 the two companies sold 6,000 MW of coal-fired plant to Eastern Electricity (subsequently
TXU). Despite the resulting considerable decrease in concentration (e.g. as measured by the
Herfindahl Hirschman Index, or HHI, equal to the sum of the squared percentage market shares),
the price-cost margin remained stubbornly high, and continued to attract regulatory concern,
investigations, blocked attempts at vertical integration, and eventually, substantial horizontal
divestiture in exchange for vertical integration with supply (Newbery, 2000).
Green and Newbery (1992) had extended Klemperer and Meyer’s (1989) theory of supply
function equilibria to deal with time varying demand in the Electricity Pool. They examined
the range of feasible equilibrium outcomes to demonstrate the importance of market power.
There is some evidence that before 1994, each company was bidding each level of output at a
lower price than would be profit maximising. Andrew Sweeting (2001) drew on this theory to
examine bidding behavior in the Electricity Pool from 1995, asking whether each players’ bids
were profit maximising given the bids of the other player(s). He found that after 1996, when
6000 MW of plant had been sold, the larger number of companies were bidding in accordance
with their individually rational pursuit of profit. Later, after further divestiture, it appeared
that bids were higher than might be expected to be individually profit maximising - in short,
there was some evidence of tacit collusion to sustain a collectively more profitable outcome. Once
fragmentation passed a critical point, however, the price-cost margin collapsed, several companies
became technically or actually bankrupt (including British Energy, which was preserved only by
2
a Government loan).
The experience of the evolution of electricity prices in Britain suggests that the link between
competitiveness (measured by the price-cost margin) and market structure is not simple. Figure
1 shows the yearly moving average real wholesale price of electricity and the generation fuel cost
on the left had scale. The line with diamond markers gives the concentration of price-setting
coal-fired plant on the right hand scale, measured by the HHI, showing the two periods of decon-
centration. The issue becomes particularly important in two practically relevant circumstances -
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Figure 1: Impact of market concentration on wholesale price.
policy-imposed restructuring to increase competition starting from a very uncompetitive struc-
ture, and market integration, where a more competitive country combines its market with a less
competitive neighbor. The case of integrating the Benelux market is a case in point, for while
the Netherlands has four comparably sized generation companies, Belgium has a single company
that in addition owns the largest Dutch generation company.
Standard market analysis based on Cournot competition would always show that dividing
capacity among a larger number of companies in the same market would reduce prices, just as
would combining two markets with the same set of previously isolated companies. A number
of countries are concerned at the degree of concentration in generation and are either requiring
divestiture (as in Italy) or temporary divestiture (virtual power plant auctions in France and
Belgium). In other countries such as the Netherlands, competition authorities have required
plant divestiture as a price for approving mergers. The European Commission is pressing for
improved market integration, through improved access to interconnectors as well as additional
investment in interconnector capacity, again with the expectation that integration will lower
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market power and improve market performance. If, instead, a modest increase in competition
results in initially higher prices, then liberalisation may fall into disrepute (as happened in the
US after the Californian debacle), and economists may lose the confidence of policy makers.
This paper discusses possible explanations of the apparently perverse relation that may
appear between concentration and price-cost margins (at high levels of concentration), to help
understand the dynamics of market restructuring better. We need to know whether such a per-
verse relationship reflects important market fundamentals or merely a disequilibrium evolution,
- the fallacy of post hoc, ergo propter hoc. There would seem to be several possible reasons why
an increase in the number of competing firms might lead to higher price-cost margins, and the
paper provides suggestive models setting out the conditions under which this might happen. The
first reason draws on the standard legal approach to competition policy, under which holding
a monopoly position is not illegal, but abusing that position is. A sensible monopoly would
therefore exercise restraint when under the surveillance of a regulatory agency.
Many jurisdictions consider that market surveillance is particularly important for the elec-
tricity supply industry, given the special features of its product: very inelastic demand in the
short run, inability to store the product and hence little intertemporal elasticity of substitu-
tion, durable, sunk and capital-intensive plant making transient entry unlikely, and transmission
constraints that fragment markets. There are additional reasons in the US for such market sur-
veillance, where the Federal Power Act of 1935 requires that electricity prices be “just and
reasonable”, implying the need for constant monitoring of prices to ensure compliance.
Electricity companies with market power will therefore exercise a degree of price restraint
when bidding plant into wholesale spot markets, depending on the extent to which they could
be accused of having and exercising market power. Given that the resulting market clearing
price will depend on the price-quantity bids of all participants, the larger the number of bidding
generators, the harder it will be for the regulator to assign blame for market manipulation, and
the less plausible will be the claim that the individual generator had significant market power
(normally taken to be at least 25% and sometimes as much as 40% of the market). The difficulty
to detect exercise of market power is well illustrated at the California example. Borenstein and
Bushnell (1999) use a Cournot approach to analyse the potential for market power in California.
Joskow and Kahn (2002) show, using the example of California’s summer of 2000, that simulated
competitive benchmark prices are below observed prices. Harvey and Hogan (2002) repeat the
simulations and run sensitivity analysis on the parameter choices. For some of their parameter
combinations, simulated prices reach observed prices. Assessing generation output, Joskow and
Kahn (2002) calculate that unilateral withholding of output to push up the wholesale price
would have been profitable for portfolio generators and, indeed, observe that ”either the units
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[of portfolio generators] were suffering from unusual operational problems or they were being
withheld from the market to increase prices.” The first set of models below attempts to capture
the implications of difficulties to monitor market power.
The second set of reasons has to do with the public good of entry prevention. If a monopoly
incumbent wishes to continue a quiet life, then pricing just below the average cost of new entry
may deliver the joint benefits of non-abusive behavior and entry deterrence. By itself this would
be consistent with a contestable and hence efficient market, but in the presence of excess capacity,
such pricing would be above the efficient and competitive level. Nevertheless, it would be the
result of a dynamic disequilibrium, to be corrected as the market tightens and new investment
is required. Inefficiency would then require the incumbent to deter entry while extracting some
monopoly rents - for example by monopolising the balancing market, making it unpredictable
and illiquid, and/or by vertical integration into supply, making the contract market illiquid to
raise the risks and hence costs of entry. The appropriate regulatory action would be to reduce
entry barriers, perhaps by allowing independent supply companies to build and contract for
competitively tendered new capacity. Meanwhile, during the period of excess capacity, a move
to divest capacity and create more competitors may reduce the individual benefit that any single
company derives from entry deterrence. The balance of short-run profits from higher prices
against greater long-run competition from entry may then favour temporarily higher price-cost
margins as concentration falls. This explanation would be a dynamic disequilibrium story, with a
more satisfactory long-run equilibrium but a period in which regulators and/or politicians might
lose their nerve if they failed to appreciate the underlying dynamics.
The first model captures the phenomenon illustrated in Figure 2, where splitting a monop-
olist into a two firms could result in a price increase.1 The model includes the regulator as an
additional player, whose monitoring effort required to detect market abuse increases with the
number of firms under surveillance. Given that, the regulator will have to balance the costs of
monitoring against the gain. The efficient response is to reduce the monitoring effort per firm
until the marginal cost of additional monitoring equals the marginal benefit of more competitive
electricity prices.
The same model can be adapted to address the case where the markets in two neighbouring
countries are to be integrated. On the reasonable assumption that each country retains its own
regulatory and competition authority, and can only properly monitor the company located within
its own country, market integration will cause both regulators to reduce their monitoring efforts
for two reasons:
1 The mark-ups are calculated used ICF’s consulting model to determine competitive prices and Heren data for
month (UK week) ahead base load contracts in the year 2002.
5
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
Degree of competition
M
a
rk
u
p 
o
v
er
 
c
o
m
pe
tit
iv
e
 
pr
ic
e
France
Netherlands
Germany
UK
Very concentrated opaque 
or missing markets
competitive
M
a
rk
u
p 
o
v
er
 
c
o
m
pe
tit
iv
e
 
pr
ic
e
Figure 2: Is there a non-monotonic link between concentration and markup?
1) The regulatory authorities are only assessing the impact of their regulation on their
home consumers, and so will not take account of the externality on consumers in the other
country. At the same time in the joint market, the impact of the decision of any one monopolist
on the home consumers is reduced, leading the regulator to reduce its effort.
2) The regulatory authority will attach weight mainly to the benefits of the domestic
utility (e.g. jobs, tax paid, informal connections), and hence continue to have the incentive to
reduce regulatory interference.
In both cases the reduced monitoring effort is counterbalanced by increased competition,
which reduces the incentive for the dominant players to exercise market power. The model
shows that the net effect depends on the relationship between regulatory effort (cost) and mon-
itoring/enforcement success.
The outcome could be improved by delegating oversight of the combined market to a joint
regulatory authority, in which case it would internalise the externality on customers in neigh-
bouring countries. This joint authority could be charged to maximise combined welfare (or,
equivalently, consumer welfare subject to a financially sustainable electricity industry). The
only difference compared to the two individual cases is that the level of competition is increased
and hence the dominant generators are less inclined to exercise market power. This suggests
that the price level should fall. The question remains whether a joint regulatory agency could
be implemented, and whether it would indeed maximise joint social welfare.
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2 Divestiture within one market
Assume n firms are suppling a market at constant marginal costs, normalised to zero. Demand
in the market is linear, characterized by:
d = D − bp. (1)
We assume a game of three periods. In the first period the generators sell electricity to consumers
in a Cournot game. However, they anticipate the potential intervention of the regulator when
deciding on their output quantity and hence on the market clearing price. In the second period
the regulator determines whether to monitor/enforce low contract prices and how much effort to
devote to this. The known objective function of the regulator is the minimisation of electricity
prices (or the price-long-run marginal cost margin) and the expenditure on market monitoring
and investigation.2 The regulator can spend more and increase the likelihood ρ with which he
will detect the exercise of market power and successfully force companies to lower their price.
(Equivalently, the regulator may be able to impose a fine after a successful court case.) The
relationship between the likelihood of success and the cost in terms of effort, political credibility
and consulting/legal fees is given by the cost function, Rρ2. In the third period the regulator
succeeds in an investigation with probability ρ. In the case of success prices are lowered to a
margin m above marginal costs. This is reflects the fact that information asymmetry prevents
the regulator from determining the exact marginal costs of an efficient generator, but has to set
the price according to the cost structure of potentially inefficient oligopolists.
The game is solved backwards. The expected price in period three paid by consumers
equals the weighted average of contract price negotiated in period p1 one and the margin m
above marginal cost (which is normalised to zero):
E[pf ] = (1− ρ) p1 + ρm. (2)
In period two the regulator chooses the probability ρ of successful ex-post intervention in the sales
price of any one generator. As there are n generators and as each will have to be investigated,
the regulator’s objective function is to:
max
ρ
−E[pf (ρ)]− nRρ
2. (3)
The first order condition gives:
ρ =
p1 −m
2Rn
. (4)
2 This is intended as a reduced-form representation of the regulator’s problem of allocating his limited budget to
market monitoring and other regulatory functions such as setting network price controls, and reflects the trade-off
between regulatory cost (direct and due to possible losses of regulatory stability and credibility) and consumer
benefit.
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In period one the oligopolist generators determine their output quantities qi to maximise profits
(which with zero normalised cost is equal to sales revenue). They anticipate that the regulator
will renegotiate the contracts with probability ρ which is a function of the spot price.
πi =
[
D − (n− 1) qj − qi
b
(1− ρ) + ρm
]
qi. (5)
Using the first order condition we can calculate that each generators’ chosen level of output is:
q =
2 (n+ 1) (F −Rbn) +
√
4 (n+ 1)2 (F −Rbn)2 + 4n (2 + n) (2RbnD − F 2)
2 (2 + n)n
, (6)
where F = D − bm.Substituting d = nq where q is given by (6) into (1) gives the period one
price p1. The regulator will only intervene if p1 > m. The probability of successful interven-
tion/regulation is then given by (4).
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Figure 3: Successful interventions on wholesale price as function of concentration.
Figure 3 shows that in equilibrium there will be more successful interventions overall with
two firms, but fewer per firm. However, given the assumed relation between costs and the success
rate, Figure 4 shows that total monitoring cost is strictly decreasing in the number of players.
Finally, Figure 5 gives the usual Cournot oligopoly price (top line), the price charged by
generation companies in period one (middle line), and the expected average price taking into
consideration the probability of regulatory intervention (bottom line), showing that it is indeed
possible for the price-cost margin to increase as the industry becomes less concentrated, although
once the number of competitors increases beyond three, prices begin to fall again.3
3 Combining two markets
Next, consider the case in which two markets are integrated and firms in both markets sell in
both regions k, but under the existing and separate regulators. Both regions are symmetric, and
3 The numerical illustrations are based on the following parameter values: D = 10, b = 1, R = 2,m = 0.5
8
8642
0.3
0.25
0.2
0.15
0.1
0.05
number of players
expenditure on interventions
Figure 4: Expenditure on market monitoring as function of concentration.
108642
5
4
3
2
1
number of players
price
Cournot
Price charged
Average price including 
reg. intervention
Figure 5: Model results for average wholesale price.
so the expected regional price is:
E[pf ] =
1
2
∑
k
((1− ρk) p1,k + ρkm) . (7)
In period two the regulator in region k chooses monitoring effort and hence the success
probability ρk of ex-post lowering the price at which a generator sold energy to maximise his
objective function:
max
ρk
−pf,k (ρk)− nRρ
2
k. (8)
The first order condition gives:
ρk =
p1,k −m
4Rn
. (9)
In period one the expected profit of a generator is:
πi =
[
2D − (2n− 1) qj − qi
2b
(1− ρk) + ρkm
]
qi, (10)
9
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Figure 6: Parameter values D=10, m=1, R=2, m=0.5.
and using the first order condition shows that the profit maximising output choice is:
q =
(2n+ 1) (F − 2Rbn) +
√
(2n+ 1)2 (F − 2Rbn)2 + 4 (n+ n2) (4RbnD − F 2)
2n (n+ 1)
.
In this example the output choice and price after the market integration is the same as that of
a single market with twice the demand and number of players but only one regulator, a result
of the specific assumption that monitoring/enforcement costs increase with the square of the
intended success rate.
However, as we continue to assume two regulators, the monitoring effort of each is lower.
Comparing (4) and (9) shows the level of monitoring/enforcement is only half that observed in
the case with an integrated regulator.
Figure 6 shows first the prices in two separate regions (thin line). If the regulators retain
their separate authorities after integration of the market, then the impact on neighbouring cus-
tomers is not internalised and the prices can be higher (dotted line). If the regulators are
merged, then we can again use results from the single market, but have to perform the following
substitutions to represent the bigger market n → 2n, D → 2D, b → 2b and finally R → R/2
as the monitoring/enforcement costs stay constant but the customer base is doubled so that the
costs per customer is reduced (heavy dotted line). Integration of regions with the simultaneous
integration of regulatory authority has the strongest impact on prices.
4 Evolution of market design
The European Commission is currently pressing the European Transmission System Operators to
improve the management of transmission constraints between regions. There is some agreement
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that from an efficiency (Neuhoff 2002) and market power mitigation perspective, Europe-wide
nodal pricing or at least market splitting is to be preferred to other solutions (Ehrenmann e.a.
2003).4 Both nodal pricing and market splitting can and should be complemented by long-
term financial transmission contracts to allow for risk hedging and reduce market power through
forward contracting (as currently implemented in PJM, Nordpool).5
However, it is difficult to envisage that all countries could be persuaded to move simultane-
ously to such a market design. It seems more likely that some regions will join up under a market
splitting arrangement, following the example of Nordpool, and that remaining regions will then
decide whether to follow. The model presented below demonstrates that such an evolution could
be precluded if the alternative approach favoured by ETSO, of an Europe-wide synchronised
auction for transmission capacity, is implemented.
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Figure 7: Total social benefit of different market designs with results from simulation.
Figure 7 illustrates, based on the numerical results derived in this section, the possibility
that a move from current separate auctions to both synchronised auctions and market splitting
in part of the network is likely to increase social welfare. Where congestion is low, the move
towards market splitting in part of the network is preferable because it is better able to mitigate
market power.6 Where the network experiences significant congestion and volatile flow patterns,
the initial move towards synchronised auctions is preferable to partial market splitting, because
4 In theory a continuum of successive transmission markets might provide for the similar result. Such a design
is difficult to implement and is unlikely to provide sufficient liquidity to allow for the redefinition of transmission
contracts in meshed networks.
5 The impact of physical or financial transmission contracts (Joskow and Tirole 2000 ) and their allocation
(Gilbert e.a. 2003 ) on strategic behavior of generators can in first order be treated separately
6 One could envisage that initially only the Benelux countries or accession countries use market splitting among
themselves while continuing separate markets towards their neighbors (as already implemented between Nordpool
and neighboring countries).
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overall transmission capacity can be allocated to better match demand in different periods. In
this latter case, a gradual move from synchronised auctions to market splitting may be difficult
to encourage through a sequence of partial steps, as it could initially result in losses of efficiency.
This suggests that a move towards synchronised auctions could result in a lock-in that makes
a subsequent gradual evolution towards market splitting/nodal pricing difficult. The analysis
also confirms that market splitting across the whole network provides the largest social benefit.
Here, transmission capacity can be allocated at a later stages to deal with uncertainties. In
addition the flexibility provided with both unconstrained and constrained transmission capacity
reduces the exercise of market power by dominant generators. This might explain the preference
of generation companies and vertical integrated TSOs for a synchronised auction.
We use the game depicted in Figure 8 to model the four different market designs: separate
auctions, market spitting in part of the network, synchronised auctions and 100% market split-
ting. In the first period, separate auctions and market splitting in part of the network results in
Splitting of T:
• NTC definition
• split auction/integrated 
market
T-auction Bids to
Energy 
Market
uncertainty uncertainty
Energy 
Market clears
(& T allocation under
market splitting)
Figure 8: Timing of transmission allocation and energy markets.
an allocation of transmission capacity between different regions. The amount of capacity to be
allocated corresponds to the current definition of Net Transfer Capacities (NTC) of ETSO. This
allocation is typically performed on a yearly basis and so it is likely that some uncertainty ε1 will
occur between the initial allocation and the day-ahead markets. In separated and synchronised
auctions and also for part of the network that is not covered by market splitting, transmission
capacity is auctioned on a day-ahead basis. Some of the information about generation availabil-
ity, demand and the resource situation of renewable output will only be revealed in the energy
markets, and so a second source of uncertainty ε2 will be revealed after the transmission auction.
In the next period of the game, generators, demand, and possibly traders submit bids to the
energy spot markets. In the final period, the energy spot markets will clear separately under
the separate and synchronised auction designs, whilst with market-splitting the spot markets are
cleared while simultaneously using transmission capacity between the regions to arbitrage the
markets.
The model assumes a symmetric three node network presented in Figure (9). Price-responsive
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demand is located at nodes A,C and competitive generation at node B with strategic genera-
tors at least at one node A.Uncertainty is concentrated at node C, where demand varies with
3GW 1.5 GW
2 GW
C
B A
Figure 9: The network
the uncertainty ε1, ε2. For simplicity we assume that εi, i = 1, 2, is uniformly distributed on
[−ei, ei].
dc = Dc + ε1 + ε2 − pc. (11)
At node B competitive generators offer output qb at marginal cost, giving the following supply
function
pb = βbqb. (12)
Finally, node A has local demand da and an oligopoly with n players each with output choice
qa,i and zero marginal costs:
da = Da − pa. (13)
Nodes A and B export, and the potential constraint is on transmission line AC with maxi-
mum transmission capacity K. According to Kirchhof’s law of physics, 1/3 of exports from node
B and 2/3 of exports from node A will pass through link AC on their way to node C. Hence the
transmission constraint can be represented by:
1
3
qb +
2
3
(∑
i
qa,i − da
)
≤ K. (14)
Ignoring transmission losses in this simplified model, conservation of energy requires:∑
i
qa,i − da + qb − dc = 0. (15)
The welfare measure for comparing the various outcomes counts consumer surplus and pro-
ducer profits equally, so that total welfare equals the consumer utility from energy consumption
minus generation cost:
W = da
(
Da −
da
2
)
+ dc
(
Dc + ε1 + ε2 −
dc
2
)
−
1
2
βbq
2
b . (16)
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4.1 Integrated markets
We start by calculating the market equilibrium prices for the 100% market splitting case. If the
transmission constraint is binding, then the transmission operator allocates transmission capacity
on the scarce link AC so that the marginal value of exports from B to C equals the twice the
marginal value of exports from A to C, corresponding to the inverse of transmission capacity
required for exports from both nodes:
pc − pa = 2 (pc − pb) . (17)
The equilibrium price pa will depend on whether or not the transmission constraint binds. If it
does bind, then the relationship between pa and the output choices of the strategic generators
can be found from (13), (11), (12) and (17). Finally as the transmission constraint is assumed
binding (14) and energy is conserved (15) gives the required relationship:
pa =
(1 + 4βb)Da −Dc − ε1 − ε2
2 + 4βb
−
1 + 4βb
2 + 4βb
∑
i
qa,i +
3
2
K. (18)
This can be used to determine the profit maximising output on the assumption that the constraint
binds, which then needs to be checked. If the condition for a binding transmission constraint,
pa > pc, is not satisfied, then the prices at all nodes will coincide. Using pa = pb = pc instead of
equation (14) and the relationship between nodal prices (17) gives a second equation for pa as
function of the strategic output choices:
pa =
Da +Dc + ε1 + ε2 −
∑
i qa,i
2 + 1/β
. (19)
If the transmission link were expected to be unconstrained, then the output choice that maximises
expected profit π = qa,iE[pa|ε1] is:
qa,i =
Da +Dc + ε1
n+ 1
. (20)
However, whether or not the constraint is expected to be binding depends on the random factor
ε1. The Cournot output choice is found by a numerical search over possible maxima for different
constraint configurations. The output qa,i that maximises the profit of individual generators
π = qa,iE[pa|ε1], depends on whether pa is given by (18) or (19).
4.2 Separate auctions
The next case to consider is that transmission for exports from A and C is allocated in separate
auctions, as is currently the case on different European interconnectors. The system operator
has to determine how to split the capacity on the constrained link AC for exports from A and
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B in the first period. This corresponds roughly to the definition of net transfer capacities of
ETSO, but is sometimes refined to take account of local dispatch plans. Thus the definition of
available transmission capacity between Germany and Netherlands is updated based on expected
flows within both countries. We assume that the criteria on which capacity is allocated ensures
that both transmission lines will stay unconstrained for the same set of ε1. Let Ea, Eb be the
export capacities made available in period 1 for exports from nodes A and B and Fa, Fb be the
export capacity that traders obtain in period 2. Since no additional information is revealed
subsequently, Fa, Fb will also schedule transmission to node C in period four. Given trade of Fi
between the nodes, the equilibrium price at each node will be pa is the Cournot output choice
with n players:
pa =
Da + Fa
n+ 1
, pb = βFb, pc = Dc + ε1 + ε2 − Fa − Fb. (21)
If the transmission remains unconstrained, then traders will arbitrage the prices pa = pb =
E[pc|ε1]. Using (21), transmission demand will be:
Fa =
(Dc + ε1) (n+ 1)β −Da (1 + β)
(1 + β + (n+ 1)β)
, Fb =
Da + Fa
β (n+ 1)
. (22)
In order to determine the transmission allocation by the transmission operator such that trans-
mission constraints for export from A and B start to bind simultaneously we substitute Fa =
Ea, Fb = Eb in (22) and require that
2Ea +Eb = 3K, (23)
to obtain the marginal realisation of uncertainty ε1 at which both constraints start to bind:
ε1 =
(1 + 2β)Da + (1 + 2β + nβ) 3K
1 + 2β + 2nβ
−Dc. (24)
Substituting Eb = Fb from (22) in (23) and substituting ε1 from (24) gives the equilibrium
allocations by the system operator:
Ea =
(
(1+2β+nβ)3K+(2β+1)Da
1+2β+2nβ
)
β (n+ 1)− (1 + β)Da
1 + 2β + nβ
, (25)
and
Eb =
(1+2β+nβ)3K+(2β+1)Da
1+2β+2nβ +Da
1 + 2β + nβ
. (26)
Now it is simple to calculate the amounts of transmission rights obtained by traders to arbitrage
the markets. If ε1 exceeds the value determined in (24) then transmission will be constrained
and Fa = Ea, Fb = Eb. Otherwise traders will arbitrage prices and use transmission capacity
according to (22).
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4.3 Joint auctions:
The difference between the joint auction and the separate auction approach is that with joint
auctions the allocation between Fa and Fb is no longer determined at the very beginning, but
only in the transmission auction which takes place after ε1 is revealed.
For ε1 smaller than the critical value determined in (24) all transmission requests can be
satisfied and the amount of utilised transmission rights is determined according to (22). The
allocation differs from the separate auction if the transmission constraint is binding. Competitive
traders bid for transmission capacity the expected value of using the transmission capacity - which
follows from the equation for nodal pricing (17):
2E[pb] = E[pa] +E[pc].
Considering the binding transmission constraint 2Fa+Fb = 3K and substituting E[pi] from (21)
gives:
Fa =
(2β + 1) 3K −Dc − ε1 −
Da
n+1
2 (2β + 1)− n
n+1
, Fb = 3K − 2Fa.
4.4 Finally, a mix
In period one transmission capacity is allocated to be either used for exports from B to C, Eb,
or to be used in the integrated market between A and C, Ea.
If all links are permanently unconstrained then the market-clearing price faced by strategic
generators is given by (19). However, the output at node B will not change in reaction to output
changes by the strategic generators, but only in anticipation of such output changes. As a result,
only demand at A and C and not output at B will adapt and ∂pa∂qa,i = −
1
2 . If, however, the
transmission constraint is binding, then the assumption of permanently unconstrained transmis-
sion is not satisfied. The strategic generators at node A will then maximise expected profits
taking into consideration that both export constraints from A and/or B can be binding. In the
numerical simulation competitive traders determine the amount of transmission rights Eb they
use for exports from B such that either prices are arbitraged in expectation or all rights are
used. Strategic generators make the output choice that maximises their expected profit given
the output choices of competitors.
4.5 Results
We initially assume that ε2 = 0 and hence the only source of uncertainty is realised before the
bids are submitted to the transmission auction and energy spot markets.
Figure 10 shows that welfare is maximised with an integrated energy and transmission
auction, a result that will be replicated in subsequent simulations. It can be noted that for a
16
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Figure 10: Welfare change: Da = 10, Dc = 10, β = 1, n = 7, e1 = 8, ε2 = 0.
negative ε1, which corresponds to low demand at node C, the export constraint from A to C
is not binding and hence the partially integrated E&T market reduces (”mixed joint/separated
auction”) the market power of generators at A and increases welfare. With the integrated
market welfare is increased further, as generators at A are then also in direct competition with
the generator at B. On the other hand, for large ε1, and hence high demand at node C, the
export constraint at node A is binding and the outcome and welfare of the partially integrated
auction coincides with the separate auction. In these circumstances the joint auction is more
beneficial, because scarce transmission capacity in the link AC can be reallocated to allow more
exports from B, which make more efficient use of the scarce resource.7
Figure 11 shows the same data as figure 10 except that the number of ologopolists is reduced
from 7 to 3. It shows that higher concentration of generation at node A makes the market-
power mitigating effect of integrating the energy and transmission markets more important,
increasing the benefit of integrating the two markets. Comparing Figures 10 and 11 we note that
where market power is weak and constraints frequently binding, the allocation of transmission
capacity conditional on the realisation of ε1 as ensured by a joint auction will provide for greater
improvements in welfare relative to a separate auction than a partially integrated energy and
transmission market. Alternatively, with less frequently constrained markets, or with increasing
market power (represented by lower n) the market-power mitigating effect of a partially integrated
7 For −2 < ε1 < 0 the separate auction results in higher welfare than a joint auction because of market power. In
order to mitigate market power, it can be beneficial to allocate transmission capacity to maximise welfare, which,
in the presence of market power, can diverge from the allocation assuming competitive behaviour. However, it
would be very difficult to specify such policies.
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Figure 11: Welfare change: Da = 10, Dc = 10, β = 1, n = 3, e1 = 8, ε2 = 0.
energy and transmission market dominates and provides for greater improvements in welfare
relative to a separate energy and transmission market than a joint transmission auction.
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Figure 12: Expected welfare change: Da = 10, Dc = 10, β = 1, n = 7, e1 = 5, e2 = 3.
Figure 12 shows the effect of introducing uncertainty ε2 after the participants submit bids.
This uncertainty corresponds to the information that is aggregated in the market only during
the auction, and is therefore not available to Cournot players submitting their bids or to energy
traders arbitraging the markets. The Figure depicts the expected welfare change based over the
distribution of ε2. Compared to Figure 10 we notice that the flexible allocation of transmission
capacity provided by the integrated energy and transmission market increases the benefit result-
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ing from the partially integrated energy and transmission market and particularly from the fully
integrated energy and transmission market, both relative to the separate market and to the joint
auction.
If ε1 and ε2 are uniformly distributed on [−5, 5] and [−3, 3] respectively, then the partially
integrated auction increases welfare by 0.4 units relative to the separate auctions, the joint
auctions improve the welfare by 0.8 units, and the integrated energy and transmission market
increases the welfare by 1.9 units. This result shows that a move towards a joint auction could
result in a lock-in. It is likely that a partially integrated market would be an intermediate step
towards an integrated market, and therefore result in welfare losses of 0.4 units. Hence the
joint auction might imply a lock-in at 1.1 units below the welfare maximum achievable with an
integrated auction.
This result depends on the exact characteristics of the market. If market power is stronger
(n = 3) then even the move from the joint auction towards an partially integrated market
design is welfare improving. The implication is that careful simulation of the various alternatives
should be undertaken before choosing particular reforms,to check that they do not result in
disadvantageous lock-ins.
5 Conclusions
The European Commission is concerned to create a single electricity market in the European
Union, and to improve trade between regions currently under separate regulation and TSOs.
Our first model suggests that the process of introducing competition within countries could
initially lead to increased prices, although further deconcentration should be pro-competitive.
The same effect can happen when integrating markets that were previously concentrated, with
the additional complication that regulatory and monitoring effort may be reduced with market
integration and could result in higher than expected prices. The problem can be addressed
by suitable cooperation between regulators. Finally, the paper addresses the question whether
the sequencing of changes to the management of interconnectors matters, and if so, whether
the resulting path-dependence may foreclose desirable end-states. The very simple model shows
that this is indeed a possibility, suggesting that in the more complex reality of the European
transmission network, it will be important to simulate alternative sequencing of the integration
of successive markets with a move to coordinated auctions.
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